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The German Tribune

Hamburg, 21 September 1980
Nineteenth Year - No. 957 - By air

A WEEKLY REVIEW OF THE GERMAN PRESS

C 20725 C
ISSN 0016-8858

Warning bells preceded Turkish coup



It cannot be said that the coup in Ankara came out of the blue. The country has long been in a desperate state.

Yet when the coup did come, it was a surprise.

Turkish military leaders must be credited with having sounded increasingly urgent warning notes for months.

In the New Year they called on Turkey's two major political parties, ousted Premier Süleyman Demirel's Justice Party and former Premier Bülent Ecevit's People's Republicans, to form a government of national unity and jointly solve the country's problems.

Both said they were willing to do so, but extremist factions (right-wingers in the one party and left-wingers in the other) effectively scotched plans for a Grand Coalition.

The brasshats have now made good their threat to assume power themselves should the politicians fail to join forces.

Whether or not this was indispensable is sure to be keenly debated both in Turkey and abroad, including Turkey's allies. But there can be little doubt that Turkey was up against it.

Inflation was running at 100 per cent, one Turk in four or five was out of work and chaos was increasingly widespread.

Three groups were mainly to blame: right-wing extremists, Marxist revolutionaries and religious fanatics. They fought each other tooth and nail, with an estimated 2,300 lives lost since Mr Demirel took over in November 1979.

Intermittently at least, entire towns were controlled by terrorist rebels.

The generals who now hold power can hardly be gainsaid when they claim that neither Mr Ecevit nor Mr Demirel has been able to point Turkey along the road to recovery.

Mr Ecevit himself recently claimed, alarmingly enough, that civil war had already begun. Last year the armed forces tried to stem the tide of chaos and violence under civilian government by imposing a state of emergency in a growing number of provinces.

At the end 20 of Turkey's 67 provinces were under martial law. Yet there was no decline in violence. Day by day terrorism cost between 10 and 15 lives.

Will the brasshats, now they have sent civilian government packing, arrested *leading politicians and dissolved all* political organisations, prove better able to solve the country's problems?

Assuming troops show the discipline expected of Turkish armed forces, they should successfully combat terrorism, but experience has shown that generals are usually inept at surmounting economic problems and bridging social gaps.

It would be most surprising if this will be any different in Turkey.

The problems facing the eastern mainstay of the Atlantic alliance are so deep-seated there are no simple solutions to them.

No-one has yet come up with a concept by which Turkey could be given a fresh lease of economic life. Even the various international commissions that have studied the subject have come up with little more than one financial shot-in-the-arm after another.

Over large areas Turkey is a backward country, yet population growth is the highest of all Western countries. What is more, Turkey is poorly endowed with natural resources.

Above all, the Turkish people have never been entirely convinced of the need for modernisation. Decades ago Kemal Atatürk tried to drag the country screaming into the modern technological era, but resistance to Westernisation and secularisation have grown apace over the past decade in particular.


One reason why the generals took over power was anxiety lest the Islamic renaissance spread with increasing efficacy from neighbouring Iran.

There was no shortage of signs this might prove the case, including the growing influence of Necmettin Erbakan's National Salvation Party and its allies, some of whom are root-and-branch extremists.

The Turkish armed forces have always

Continued on page 2

IN THIS ISSUE



Hungarian Foreign Minister Frigyes Puja (left) in Bonn for talks on world affairs and economic cooperation with Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. (Photo: dpa)



Assistant US Secretary of State Warren Christopher (left) with Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher in Bonn where they discussed disarmament and Turkey. Mr Christopher said the US agrees with Bonn that the first instalment of military aid for Turkey should go ahead as arranged. (Photo: Bundesbildstelle)

'Cordial link' with Budapest

Hungarian Foreign Minister Frigyes Puja *ran into some difficulties* during his visit to Bonn this month.

He had deferred an earlier visit because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

But, as the first Warsaw Pact Foreign Minister to visit Bonn since Afghanistan, he was naturally confronted with queries levelled more at Moscow than at Budapest.

Ties between Bonn and Budapest have remained as cordial as they were before the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

They are based, as Bonn Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher stressed, on first-rate economic ties that are first-rate because Hungarian economic planners have embarked on moderate reforms enabling them use leeway, *especially in foreign trade.*

But in chequered periods business cannot continue as usual between East and West as though nothing had happened and no attention needed to be paid to politics.

Hungary has carried out its obligatory exercises in socialist solidarity as quietly as possible, emphasising as it did so that Budapest was also interested in persevering with detente.

In Mr Puja's talks with Foreign Minister Genscher and Chancellor Brandt the issue mainly at stake was how far this policy could be further pursued without losing sight of one's own interests, differing as they did in view of different systems.

Both sides felt the Helsinki review conference in Madrid and progress in bilateral ties would point the way.

Hungary hoped, in tried and trusted fashion, to remain well below the profile of major East-West problems and to make best use of the advantages already gained.

Werner Blum

(Kieler Nachrichten, 12 September 1980)

WORLD AFFAIRS

Madrid conference will set Moscow task of justifying Afghanistan

For years Moscow hankered after the all-European conference held in Helsinki five years ago as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

The West was most reluctant to espouse this favourite Soviet idea because it was well aware of the Kremlin's predilection for mammoth conferences with the aim of, for the most part, to generate as much Soviet-style peace propaganda as possible.

They are envisaged first and foremost as instruments of Soviet foreign policy, and the 1975 Helsinki conference undoubtedly served this purpose.

Moscow was certified to be legally entitled, as it were, to its post-World War II conquest in Europe. This — no more and no less — is what the renunciation of the use of force to settle political dispute amounted to as negotiated.

Yet the West too accomplished much in the first round of CSCE negotiations. Take, for instance, the written agreement on human rights or the agreement on free flow of information and views.

Moscow naturally only agreed to these terms too because it was (and remains) firmly resolved only to permit in its own sphere of influence such human rights and freedom of information and viewpoint as corresponded to its own ideology.

But Afghanistan and recent events in Poland have shown the Soviet Union that this intention is easier said than done.

At the forthcoming second Helsinki review conference in Madrid (the first was held in Belgrade two years ago) the Soviet Union is sure to be asked whether its invasion of Afghanistan can be reconciled with the letter, let alone, the much-vaunted spirit of Helsinki.

This is a query Moscow is sure to answer indefatigably with run-of-the-mill Soviet propaganda, but it will present problems nonetheless.

The West does not, as Bonn Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher noted, want to launch a tribunal, but the Kremlin ought not to get off scot-free either. The shadow of events in Poland will hang heavily over the Madrid conference too.

How does the Soviet Union propose to deal with this tricky agenda item? The answer is to be found in preparations for the Madrid review conference, which have entered their final stage under the aegis of the new Spanish Foreign Minister.

Moscow and its fellow-travellers will call for a fresh mammoth gathering, a European disarmament conference.

This latest project, keenly endorsed for some time by the Poles in the East and the French in the West, is in keeping with the old Soviet tactic of emphasising disarmament whenever an inconvenient issue arises.

After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Mr Brezhnec rejoined the fray with the same move, choosing to discuss matters with the West German Chancellor. But in view of the promising results Herr Schmidt brought back from Moscow the West can well afford to toe the Soviet line of an all-European disarmament conference.

At a gathering of this kind, naturally attended by the United States, the credibility of the Soviet desire to disarm might well be ascertained.

Encouraging experience with the long-term effects of the Helsinki conference and the permanent massive arms build-up by the Soviet Union over the past 10 years are two more good reasons for accepting the Soviet proposal calling for actions, not words, by the Kremlin.

Since Moscow has long realised that the spirit of Helsinki is fraught with danger for the Soviet sphere of influence, it is bound to regard all Helsinki follow-up conferences with increasing scepticism.

Thus the European disarmament conference is a Soviet evasive move but nonetheless fits the cap of Western détente policy.

Sooner than provide the Soviet Union with even as much as a pretext of this kind the West would do well to sponsor the undertaking even though the difficulties may prove immense and take years to resolve.

Rudolph Bernhard

(Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 12 September 1980)

Turkish coup

Continued from page 1

regarded themselves as the custodian of Atatürk's legacy.

So unlike other countries where the armed forces have seized power over the past 10 years, Turkish generals are neither reactionary nor opposed to progress.

They are committed to the ideas of Atatürk, the father of modern Turkey, and dead set against a reversion to Islamic theocracy as in Iran.

In other respects, however, they represent the same danger as other military regimes. They have scant understanding for social demands, so under their aegis social gaps are unlikely to be more than papered over and sure not to be bridged.

Thus the generals eventually are unlikely to hand over a settled country to civilian government. Turkey's problems will continue to beset the country and re-erupt at some future date.

The best the military can hope to accomplish is to put paid to terrorist bloodshed, give the country peace and quiet for a while and temporarily restore confidence in the Turkish state.

But a sick man is not restored to health merely by being ordered to fall in and march in unison for a while.

The coup presents the West, Nato and the EEC with fresh problems. Fortunately the Turkish government had not applied for full membership of the Common Market.

A membership bid would probably have been rejected in any case; it could certainly not be considered while the country was governed by the military.

But Nato will need to consider how it is to size up the new situation. Much will depend on how the Turkish armed forces exercise their power.

Any attempt at a purge accompanied by bloodshed would substantially weaken their position.

Wolfgang Wagner

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 13 September 1980)

Big powers under fire over nuclear policies

Seldom do the United States and the Soviet Union join forces at an international conference against a substantial number of developing and industrialised countries.

But this was what happened at the failed four-week conference in Geneva to review the 10-year-old nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

Representatives of the Group of 77, now more than 100 countries, were particularly scathing in their criticism of the nuclear powers' behaviour.

The nuclear powers mainly enjoyed the benefits of the treaty, these delegates argued, and did not have to abide by the obligations it imposed on others.

What concerned the developing countries most was the undertaking by the nuclear powers to embark on effective moves towards nuclear disarmament.

Unrealistic though many demands made by the Group of 77 may be (the demand for direct participation in negotiations between the superpowers, for instance), it is right inasmuch as nuclear armament has anything but been scaled down since the non-proliferation treaty came into force.

Indeed, by virtue of the introduction of new weapons systems nuclear armament has steadily snowballed.

The two Salt agreements between America and Russia do not entail disarmament either; they merely impose a high ceiling on the two countries' nuclear arsenals.

Washington and Moscow were very much in agreement at the Geneva non-proliferation review conference, refusing to make a firm commitment to abide by the terms of Salt 2 as though it were already ratified.

They refused to do so even though this is exactly what they are doing in practice (just as they have continued to abide by the terms of Salt 1 despite its having expired).

Differences of opinion on issues such as these eventually led to the Geneva conference failing to agree on a final document.

The nuclear have-nots testified to their dissatisfaction on two further points. They argued that the non-proliferation treaty did not effectively prevent other nuclear powers from emerging.

They also complained about assistance that was to have been lent by the big two in atoms for peace programmes — complaints that did indeed sound justified.


The head of steam was taken off this problem, however, by fissile material supplier countries, such as Canada, scrapping restrictions previously imposed.

At Geneva the nuclear powers were, by and large, on the defensive. Their opponents were in a better position because, on the whole, they have chosen to abide by undertakings aimed at containing the nuclear threat.

But this is a state of affairs that may change one of these days.

(Der Tagesspiegel, 9 September 1980)

Soviet Union stands firm on special position of Berlin



The Soviet Union has reaffirmed its view that West Berlin is a special political entity in the middle of the GDR under occupation by the United States, Britain and France.

A *Tass* declaration adds that both the city's special status and the provision that it does not form a part of the Federal Republic and is not governed by Bonn are reiterated in the September 1971 Four-Power Agreement.

"This agreement," the official Soviet news agency writes, "carefully balances the interests of parties concerned, ensuring each the maximum possible without prejudicing the rights of others."

The agreement on West Berlin is said to have proved an unqualified success. It is an important factor in European and international detente and is in no way in need of review.

This attitude by the Soviet Union on the subject naturally only holds good as long as the treaty terms are strictly observed and fully implemented by all concerned.

Tass dismissed as totally unfounded reports that Mr Brezhnev envisaged neutral status of any kind of the two German states.

Such rumours circulated in the West were apparently intended to sow the seeds of suspicion among European countries, the agency claimed.

There could be no question of stagnation in ties between Bonn and Moscow, whoch was, of course, not the same as saying there were no problems in bilateral relations.

The Soviet Union is of the opinion that Bonn could, by entering into negotiations on medium-range missiles at the earliest opportunity, to a certain extent help to breathe life back into the Vienna troop-cut talks.

If talks on limiting medium-range missiles based in Europe had still not been launched it was not the Soviet Union's fault. *ddp*

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12 September 1980)

The German Tribune
Publisher: Friedrich Reinecke. Editor-in-Chief: [illegible] Heinz. Editor: Alexander Anthony. English language sub-editor: Simon Burnett. — Distribution manager: Georgine Picone.
Friedrich Reinecke Verlag GmbH, 23 Schoene Aussicht, Hamburg 76, Tel.: 22 85 1. Telex: 02-14733.
Advertising rates list No. 13 —
Annual subscription DM 35.
Printed by Druck- und Verlagshaus Friedrich Pfeiffer, Bremen-Blumenthal. Distributed in the USA by: MASS MAILINGS, Inc. 540 West 24th Street, New York, N.Y. 10011.
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HOME AFFAIRS

Identity of 'the enemy within' depends on the political vantage point

There are two spectres at large in the Federal Republic of Germany: the enemy of peace and the enemy of freedom.

Politicians of all hues and colours claim to have seen them — though of course always on the other side of the barricades.

The four party chairmen, Willy Brandt, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Helmut Kohl and Franz Josef Strauss (in alphabetical order), have tried on television to tell the public where to look for the enemies.

What is at stake is not the abstract terms "peace" and "freedom" but the simple and necessary question as to the policy most likely to help secure our endangered peace, and thus our freedom.

Neither witticisms nor verbal muscle flexing, nor utopian hopes can get us any further.

Peace is not something that happens of its own accord. It is the result of tedious, patient and tenacious work.

There are always those in an election campaign who believe that labelling the political opponent as an enemy of peace must bear fruit at the polls. But the very attempt to do this is dangerous nonsense because it distracts from the necessary matter-of-fact debate of the issues at stake.

Of course, no party and no politician in this country wants war. And those who say that Franz Josef Strauss wants exactly this are as wrong, as are Strauss and Kohl in saying that the Social Democrats are about to sell the nation to the Soviets.

Having said this, it is time to ask the pertinent question: which political course will not create more risks but will reduce the danger to the delicate balance in the world?

One of the reasons why the conservatives are lashing out at the governing coalition could be that their candidate is not exactly convincing on this matter. Strauss has a long record of saying the wrong thing during his political career, and this makes the CDU jitters understandable.

The Shadow Chancellor, who never tires of telling his audiences that he alone has the right answers on foreign and security policy, has too often put his bets on the wrong horse and picked the wrong friends.

The German-American ties which he now so ardently promotes are just one example. There was a time when Strauss was equally ardent in promoting Gaullism with its clearly anti-American traits.

Africa is another example. Back in the days when many African politicians desperately and vainly asked for Western assistance in their struggle against colonial rule, Strauss was a frequent visitor to South Africa and to Ian Smith's Rhodesia.

His obviously benevolent understanding for the white minority regimes despite their flagrant racism cost the Federal Republic of Germany dearly in terms of African confidence.

And when some of the most devoted Strauss fans told the world that the black liberation movements were bolshevist gangs of murderers there was not a word of censure forthcoming from Bavaria.

Assuming that the West European and American foreign and security policy is based on the precept that Soviet aggression in Afghanistan and in parts of Africa can only be brought under control through partnership with the Third World and the non-aligned nations, it becomes obvious that the Shadow Chancellor has often been in the wrong boat — especially when praising Rhodesia's Ian Smith and Chile's Pinochet.

A policy that will help to secure peace and freedom must be based on insight into historic contexts. But Strauss, who likes to depict himself as an historian, is obviously lacking on this score.

He neither understands the complicated ramifications in the hectic decolonisation process nor does he fully understand what is at stake in Poland today.

He evidently has a hard time understanding that Poland's policy makers have to cope with both a German and a Russian trauma.

Anybody who has tried to kindle internal Polish conflicts has had to come to grips with all Poles.

The fact that Strauss now wants to help the Polish workers but not their "corrupt and bankrupt regime" simply shows that he has — as so often before — bitten off more than he can chew.

Werner Holzer

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 3 September 1980)

Opposition steps up the pace as election nears

The CDU/CSU has stepped up the pace of the election campaign. As part of the build-up, it organised a demonstration of unity to back the Shadow Chancellor.

About 1,000 party officials were at Mannheim for the occasion, which was highly satisfactory for the party brass.

The northern branch of the CDU went out of its way to ensure that, once the polling is over on the 5 October election day, nobody will be able to say that it did not carry its weight.

The question now is whether this demonstrative cheering of Strauss can be converted into votes.

Pollsters still give the conservatives a chance — but not their candidate.

What matters now for the CDU/CSU is to fight tenaciously for every vote. After all, it is not the pollsters but the voters who will decide on who is to have a seat in the 9th Bundestag. This is doubly difficult for somebody who has already been labelled the loser.

Small wonder, then, that otherwise level-headed politicians have become jittery and their language tough and insulting. Small wonder, also, that they only speak in superlatives, overlooking the lesser things of everyday life.

But it is these everyday issues that concern millions of voters. The big rhetoric of a change that will prove fateful for the nation does not rob the average citizen of his sleep. He is much more concerned with the issue of social security pensions. But calling the chancellor a political pensions swindler is unlikely to convince the man-in-the-street. Mudslinging such as this could very easily boomerang.

With all the frenzy of the campaign, the voter has remained remarkably calm and unimpressed by the barrages.

It is good if the citizen keeps a cool heas even if politicians lose theirs at times.

Hans Wolff

(Nordwest Zeitung, 1 September 1980)

FDP offers a message

Under the slogan: "All's at stake this time — so vote FDP" the liberals opened the hotted-up phase of the election campaign with a meeting in Bonn.

FDP Chairman Hans-Dietrich Genscher told the 3,000 participants that the party's objective was to prevent absolute majority, to stop Strauss becoming Chancellor and to continue the coalition with the SPD.

After the shock of the North Rhine-Westphalia election when the FDP failed to take the five per cent hurdle (and even in 1969 and 1972 it only did so with the help of the SPD's second ballot) the "all" in the slogan plainly and simply stands for the five per cent hurdle.

But the SPD wants to become the strongest party this time and therefore advises its voters against giving their other vote to the FDP. This is to go to Helmut Schmidt instead.

As a result, Genscher wooed the CDU voters for their second ballot with the slogan: "This decade's Erhard is Count Lambsdorff", thus depicting the Bonn Economic Affairs Minister as the only guarantor of the endangered market economy.

Concerned over the coalition's détente policy, Herr Genscher vainly appealed to all parties to keep the Polish events out of their campaigns.

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, 5 September 1980)

How the parties have fared

Proportion of the vote under proportional system

	1949	1953	1957	1961	1965	1969	1972	1976
CDU/CSU	31,0	45,2	50,2	45,3	47,6	46,1	44,9	48,6
SPD	29,2	28,8	31,8	36,2	39,3	42,7	45,8	42,6
FDP	11,9	9,5	7,7	12,8	9,5	5,8	8,4	7,9

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Twenty parties line up at the barrier

Twenty political parties are contesting the general election on October 5. Five parties are already represented in the Bundestag or in one of the state Assemblies with at least five MPs. They needed no signature lists in support of their application. They are: SPD, CDU, CSU, FDP and the "Greens" (environmentalists). The latter have five MPs in the Baden-Württemberg Assembly and four in Bremen.

Another 15 grouping have also been recognised by the National Election Committee, along with the major parties. They include the German Communist Party (DKP), the National Democratic Party (NPD), the Communist Federation of West Germany (KBW) and the German Freedom Party (DFP) of the self-appointed Shadow Chancellor, Hans Hermann Weyer. (This last party was subsequently taken off the list — Ed.)

Three groupings failed to gain recognition as parties: the God's World Law Party, the Absolute State and World Peace Association and the Social-Liberal Party of Germany. These three either lacked the necessary documents or there were doubts as to their status as a party.

The 15 newly recognised parties must present supporting lists of signatures for their district candidature lists.


DKP executive board member Kurt Fritsch said that the fact that "members of the DKP were barred from civil service jobs for being candidates and thus only making use of their constitutionally guaranteed rights" was a flagrant violation of the Constitution.

An obviously extreme rightist "People's Socialist Movement" called "the present rule an 'ochlocracy' (mob rule).

An Action Community Mature Citizens wants to do away with political parties. But to start with they (successfully) applied for recognition as a party.

The association Absolute State and World Peace combined its application for recognition as a party with a request for an advance on the campaign fund allocation. *dpa*

(Lübecker Nachrichten, 29 August 1980)



PEOPLE

Schröder, a disciple of Adenauer, is 70

Gerhard Schröder has turned seventy, but there was a bitter note to his birthday celebrations since North Rhine-Westphalia has not put him on its ticket and he can thus not stand for the Bundestag seat he has held for so long.

He would very much have liked to serve another four years as chairman of the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee.

But he had increasingly become an outsider within the CDU — a development which was ushered in at the 1971 party congress in Saarbrücken where Rainer Barzel won the upper hand over the Kohl-Schröder team.

Now there are young MPs in the Bundestag who were born in those post-war years when Schröder, Strauss and Barzel entered active politics.

For them, Gerhard Schröder, who served in the first Bundestag as his party's deputy floor leader, has become part of history many of them know only from hearsay. Herr Schröder served 16 years without a break as a Cabinet member. First as Interior Minister, then as Foreign Minister then as Defence Minister.

Konrad Adenauer wanted a man with a firm and steady hand — someone with a legal background — to head his Interior Ministry, which was not in the best of shape.

Schröder was said to have been Adenauer's favourite disciple, and there are those who say that this prompted Adenauer in 1953 to give him the Interior Ministry.

In fact, Adenauer and Schröder had only one thing in common: aloofness. For the rest, they differed widely in temperament and character — but not in their philosophy of statesmanship.

Unlike Adenauer, Schröder gives the impression of coldness and reserve. He is anything but outgoing and this could well have been the reason why he always found it hard to rally his party's support in parliament.

Be this as it may, Gerhard Schröder was long a key figure within the CDU and was generally considered the uncrowned king of Protestant MPs from Northern Germany.


Even the worst of his enemies — and there has never been a shortage of them — have never denied that he is a man of great intelligence, stamina and political talent.

In spring 1963, whin Adenauer made his last bid to prevent Ludwig Erhard from becoming his successor, Heinrich Krone and Heinrich von Brentano denied him their support.

Adenauer then turned to Gerhard Schröder whose answer was: "Not now." He thus intimated his aim of becoming a CDU Chancellor himself.

After Erhard's fall in 1966, Schröder made his bid but was outvoted by his fellow CDU MPs in favour of Kurt Georg Kiesinger.

As far back as the 1950s, Schröder intimated in confidential talks that he considered himself a future CDU Chancellor after the Grand Coalition when he



Gerhard Schröder (Photo: Smith)

would again go into coalition with the FDP.

But his hour never came because the FDP changed.

In 1969, when Schröder was a presidential candidate, the FDP voted for Gustav Heinemann rather than for him.

Gerhard Schröder never made it to the very top, but all his defeats have been honourable and have left his image unblemished.

Georg Schröder

(Die Welt, 11 September 1980)

Strauss, 65, aims high

For most people, the 65th birthday means retirement. Shadow Chancellor Franz Josef Strauss would like it to mark the climax of his political career.

Having turned 65 on 6 September, he would like to emerge as chancellor from the 5 October general elections.

Strauss frequently points to Konrad Adenauer — not only as a political guru but also because he was 73 when he was elected this country's first Chancellor.

Franz Josef Strauss' 65th birthday coincides with the hot phase of the election campaign — reason enough for both his friends and political opponents to delve into the biography of post-war Germany's most controversial politician.

The stations in the life of a man who has been in the political limelight for the past 30 years are so well known and have been commented on so often that there is hardly anything new to be said.

Everybody knows that Franz Josef Strauss is an out-and-out Munich Bavarian, son of a butcher.

Instead of taking over his father's business, he opted for higher education and studied history, German language and literature, later economics.

Having served as a lieutenant in World War II, he was a founding member of the CSU and became Germany's youngest country director at the age of 30.

In 1949, he became a member of the Bundestag.

He subsequently served in the Bonn government, holding at various times the portfolios of nuclear energy, defence and finance.

The Spiegel affair proved his undoing as a cabinet member. For the past two years he has been prime minister of Bavaria.

Now, all eyes are riveted on this stocky statesman. Some expect miracles from him while others say that he spells doom for the nation. In fact, he is usually seen at one extreme or the other.

This does less than justice to the man; but he has no right to complain since he has done little to correct this image. Even his closest political friends have complained time and again that they know so little about what he really thinks.

In nominating Strauss as their chancellorship candidate, the CDU/CSU pinned their hopes on him as a man of action who does not shirk decisions.

Their optimism has since been dampened — and many of his followers ask themselves whether today's Strauss is still the old Strauss.

But then, what is the old Strauss? — Perhaps no more than a number of cliches that differ depending on the vantage point?

Is Strauss, this contradictory personality and eloquent speaker who in his campaign attracts the masses like a magnet and yet cannot convince them, perhaps a man who is not so sure of himself and who hesitates just like the others?

Any attempt at analysing Franz Josef Strauss can never be more than exactly that: an attempt. Question marks will always remain. Still, happy birthday!

(Handelsblatt, 5 September 1980)

Death of judge who opposed the Third Reich

Former Constitutional court judge Fabian von Schlabrendorff died recently, aged 73.

He was one of the best known representatives of the resistance movement against the Hitler regime — and one of the few who survived.

He greatly contributed towards understanding this "uprising of the conscience."

Born in 1907, the son of a long line of officers, he nevertheless became a jurist — a jurist who was *not* guided by the letter of the law but by the concept of justice.

He once wrote: "No-one should be guided by the letter of the law alone. In a case of emergency, laws that were meant for everyday life cease being applicable."

It was therefore a source of great satisfaction for him that during his time at the Constitutional Court (1967 to 19..) Article 20 of the Constitution was supplemented by a passage governing not only the right to but the onus of resistance.

It was destiny rather than coincidence that this lawyer and reserve officer came in touch with the resistance group around Stauffenberg at a very early stage.

Von Schlabrendorff was involved in an abortive attempt to assassinate Hitler in 1943. After the 20th July 1944 attempt on Hitler's life, he was arrested and put before a "People's Court" which acquitted him.

But Himmler arbitrarily "sentenced" him to death. He was put into a concentration camp and was saved when the Allies walked in.

After 1945, he worked again as a lawyer and wrote his much-read book Officers Against Hitler.

In a celebration commemorating the 30th anniversary of the uprising against Hitler he said that "in the history of the German people this was an episode rather than an epoch."

It was with equal matter-of-factness htat he arrived at the painful conclusion that neither he nor other members of the resistance had succeeded in lending much popularity to the 20th of July and that commemorating that day had therefore lost its meaning.

Said he: "We Germans can never get together on an issue." Fabian von Schlabrendorff served the cause of justice and human rights to the very end.

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 5 September 1980)

Rebel minister comes back

Karl Schiller, Bonn's former superminister (he held both the finance and the economic affairs portfolios) has rejoined the SPD.


In 1972, when Schiller resigned in anger, the break seemed sealed for good. It was no more and no less than a dispute over market economy principles that prompted him to resign at the time.

The fact that the conflict reached its climax in an election year was a severe blow to the Social Democrats, notwithstanding the fact that they achieved their best election results ever.

The party was slow in forgiving Schiller the self-assured way in which the sensitive minister conducted his battle: like a star (which he was) tackling mere extras. Though he at times joined Erhard in his campaign to defend the market economy, Schiller never became a renegade.

Only a few years after the break with the SPD he said that this country had a combination of the freedom of market economy and a social state which would help cope with the tasks of the future. He has been unstinting in his esteem of Helmut Schmidt.

Like Karl Schiller, the SPD also promoted a step-by-step reconciliation.



Karl Schiller (Photo: Sven Simon)

After all, the ex-super minister was one of the co-authors of the "Godesberg Programme" and the shining symbol of the SPD's economic acumen who helped bring about the 1969 change of government.

Though his return to the party fold is less spectacular than his 1972 resignation, for the SPD it amounts to a sort of self-confirmation and for Karl Schiller it is the avowal of a creed — although he did not return as a repentant sinner.

(Die Zeit, 12 September 1980)

STATE SECURITY

Decision on terrorists rebounds on Interior Minister



Bonn Interior Minister Gerhart Baum has missed out on what could easily have proved an election campaign winner for himself and his Free Democrats, junior partners in Helmut Schmidt's coalition which goes to the polls on 5 October.

Had he only made sure last March that terrorists Christian Klar and Adelheid Schulz, wanted in connection with several murders, had been arrested when Hamburg agents were hot on their heels, he could now be preening himself as a hero.

Instead he is rated a security risk by the Opposition Christian Democrats and blamed for what *Die Welt*, the Bonn daily newspaper, has called the mistaken decision to trail the two rather than apprehend them.

Is it really a failure out of which campaign capital can be made? Views differ even in the Opposition ranks. Hamburg CDU leader Jürgen Echternach, chairman of the city's parliamentary control commission for the intelligence service, has absolved the Hamburg unit of the *Verfassungsschutz* of blame for the mishap.

CDU national chairman Helmut Kohl and Friedrich Zimmermann, head of the CSU parliamentary group in Bonn, were both briefed by experts and had long known about the March mishap.

Yet they insisted on recalling Bonn MPs from the hustings for a special session of the Bundestag home affairs committee. If this session were not held they threatened to recall the entire Bundestag to set up a commission of enquiry.

The authorities concerned — the Bonn Interior Ministry, Hamburg's home affairs department and the director of public prosecutions, Karlsruhe, — are in a difficult position.

No-one can or will expect them to divulge official secrets about a manhunt that may well still be in progress. *Verfassungsschutz* officials in Cologne have had to look on helplessly while *Die Welt* almost daily published new revelations by sources alleged to be security experts.

The aim is evidently to create the impression that the Interior Minister and maybe even the Chancellor have good reason to keep quiet or leave the facts unclear.

Herr Baum's critics would particularly like to know why the director of public prosecutions, Kurt Rebmann, and the *Bundeskriminalamt* were not notified by the Minister until a week had elapsed and it was allegedly too late to arrest Klar and Schulz.

One could equally well ask whether he might not have notified Karlsruhe too soon. The Interior Minister is by no means automatically obliged to refer to the police each and every tip he is given by the *Verfassungsschutz*.

He is responsible not only for security but also for ensuring there is no breach of the Constitution. It is for him to weigh up the relative claims of the intelligence agencies and the police.

There are good reasons why the two are organisationally separate. When the *Verfassungsschutz*, or domestic counter-intelligence agency, was set up great care was taken to ensure it could never emerge as a successor to the *Reichssicherheitshauptamt* or *Gestapo*.

Relations between the *Verfassungsschutz* in Cologne and the *Bundeskriminalamt* in Wiesbaden have long been strained, especially in countering left-wing terrorism. Tension has arisen from different approaches and methods.

The *Verfassungsschutz*, unlike the police, is not obliged to keep strictly within the limits of the law. It is entitled to trail terrorists for some time without obligation to arrest them, always assuming observation seems the more appropriate course of action.

Its brief is not to arrest individual suspects but to prevent fresh crimes.

The apprehension of Christian Klar, who is variously rated either as the killer or as the paymaster of the Red Army Faction, would undeniably have been a feather in the agency's cap.

But no-one could seriously argue that this alone would have forestalled a fresh terrorist attack. Klar is not the leader of the terrorist commandos; their decisions are taken collectively.

In 1976, for instance, the police were able, by virtue of a fortunate coincidence, to arrest Siegfried Haag, a lawyer who was made out to be a terrorist gang leader. He even had coded coup plans on him.

But his apprehension in no way prevented a succession of terrorist attacks the following year. They included the murder of Siegfried Buback, director of public prosecutions, Jürgen Ponto, Frankfurt banker, and Hanns-Martin Schleyer, Cologne employers federation chairman.

There was also an unsuccessful bid to strafe the Karlsruhe office of the director of public prosecutions with rockets.

The terrorists are known to be keen newspaper readers and one can well imagine them rubbing their hands with glee as they read the latest revelations about *Verfassungsschutz* operations and coordination between the various authorities.

By the same token officers immediately associated with fighting terrorism are not going to feel encouraged when their work is made more difficult by levity, incompetence, election campaign considerations or sheer stupidity.

It is not the Interior Minister's behaviour that is scandalous but the call by a number of Opposition politicians to give security issues full publicity treatment.

Karl-Heinz Janssen

(Die Zeit, 12 September 1980)

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Threat from the right 'not just a shadow'

Bavarian Interior Minister Gerold Tandler reproved a *Deutschlandfunk* interviewer who asked him whether right-wing extremism represented a danger to West Germany.

"You really must not set up a shadow empire or call into existence a shadow threat over and above what actually exists," he said.

Yet a number of these shady figures had just been arrested, having proved extremely dangerous. Manfred Roeder, an ex-lawyer with previous convictions for right-wing terrorism, has lately been responsible, together with his accomplices, for a series of bomb raids.

The latest raid, on a Hamburg home of Vietnamese refugees, cost two lives.

So to rate right-wingers a mere shadow threat is wide of the mark, as experts at the Bonn Interior Ministry have long realised.

Interior Minister Gerhart Baum first encountered serious xenophobia in the Baden-Württemberg local elections. It was, he said, an atmosphere in which right-wing extremism could well flourish.

The Christian Democrats, the ruling party in the south-west, capitalised on this explosive sentiment in the election campaign, calling for camps in which foreigners who sought political asylum were to be housed.

Demands such as this could hardly fail to make matters even worse, which made the position even more dangerous, Herr Baum sounded a warning note both in public and in private, reminding people that xenophobia had so much to answer for in Germany and should be combated at all costs.

Then came the first bomb raid on a foreigners' hostel in Lörrach on the Swiss border, which was promptly attributed to right-wingers by *Bundeskriminalamt* specialists.

A manhunt began, especially for Roeder, a right-wing gang leader who now preferred to live abroad: in exile, as French right-wingers explained on TV.

The arrests in North Germany show how right fears were that right-wing extremism was proving a growing danger, especially among young people.

In the past many right-wing groups, such as the Hoffmann martial arts group in Nuremberg, have seemed too exotic to be taken seriously.

Besides, right-wing extremism tended to be compared with Hitler and the Nazis, and in comparison it hardly seemed alarming. A handful of politicians sounded a constant warning about the danger of right-wing activities, but they too were not taken seriously.

Warnings about left-wing extremism were more successful, so to speak. Besides, they were more easily made, given the fact that left-wing terrorism was an established fact with a blood-spattered track record.

In arresting the right-wingers, who promptly confessed, the police has shown it has the situation under control.

In the past right-wingers have often got off with token punishment. This time the evidence is so overwhelming that the courts should be able to ensure the offenders get their just deserts.

Hans Peter Riese

(Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt, 14 September 1980)

■ FINANCE

Decision to bolster Warsaw treasury made with mixed feelings

Nothing is the same any more in Poland after the success of the Gdansk shipyard workers' strike.

The people have taken new heart. They hope that even in a Communist country the rigidity of the system will soften. And all people of goodwill in the West join in their hope.

Doubts arise only when the head wins the upper hand over the heart.

Can the Communist Party's claim to absolute rule tolerate trade union opposition? Communist ideology and historic experience make this seem improbable. And even those who console themselves with the fact that a start has to be made somewhere cannot be certain that all will now be well in Poland.

The following question now is as acute as it was before the Gdansk events: is it right to support with Western money a Communist regime which does not enjoy the confidence of the population?



The views were divided even before the Gdansk strike when 25 German banks, headed by the Dresdner, agreed in mid-August to grant Poland a DM1.2bn credit.

When the strike began shortly thereafter, conservative Shadow Chancellor Franz Josef Strauss was quick off the mark in saying we could not put billions into a bankrupt and corrupt economic system in a bid to rehabilitate it. This would give the Poles neither more freedom nor a better standard of living.

But the Shadow Chancellor's view is not representative of West German conservatives as a whole. Lower Saxony's Prime Minister, Ernst Albrecht, approves of credits for Poland in principle, on condition that they benefit the people.

Herr Albrecht omitted to say, however, how this was to be ensured. Now that the strikes are over, the foreign policy spokesman of the conservatives, Alois Mertes, would like to turn economic aid for Poland into a comprehensive Western peace strategy.

Even taking into account that the election campaign is in full swing, there are still considerable differences of opinion in evidence in the CDU/CSU camp.

Bonn has wisely desisted from any comments on the events in Poland. But there is no doubt about whose side the Chancellor and his deputy are on. Even so, they have always been prepared to assist Poland's Communist regime with credits — not because they want to support the regime but because economic aid is an important element of their détente policy. In doing so, they are prepared to accept the fact that the ruling strata in Poland will benefit.

What matters are two things: a nation in central Europe which is tumbling into an economic abyss is a direct threat to peace. Moreover, by providing credits and thus helping explore and exploit new coal deposits in Poland we improve our own energy supply.

Poland owes more money to Western banks than any other East Bloc country. The current figure is 20 billion dollars.

Only a year and a half ago, a consortium of German banks headed by Deutsche Bank gave Poland a DM2bn credit which was fully guaranteed by Bonn.

The banks therefore do not have to worry about their money even should Poland become insolvent.

So far, however, the Poles have always repaid their debts on time. Nevertheless, the banks were somewhat reticent this time when a Polish delegation came to Germany to negotiate the latest credit, the Poles being up to their necks in water.

In fact, the credit was only granted because the Chancellor told the banks that Bonn was greatly interested in Poland getting the money. The bankers, in turn, told Bonn that it should, in this case, underwrite part of the credit. As a result, the banks will provide DM800m, the other DM400m being guaranteed by Bonn.

Incidentally, this is the first time that German bankers have yielded to gentle political pressure from Bonn.

Naturally, the risk has become even bigger now because the strike has further weakened the Polish economy. Even so, it is politically right that Bonn and the banks should stick to their agreement.

Moreover, the banks' risk is calculable. The unsecured part of the credit which the individual banks will provide is small enough to prevent the loss of the money from turning into a disaster.

Besides, there is every likelihood that, should Poland prove insolvent, the Soviet Union will jump into the breach.

Rudolf Herlt

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 2 September 1980)

Belgrade bid for loan

Belgrade has applied to Bonn — and to other Western capitals—for financial assistance.

Yugoslavia's federal Parliament authorised the Central Bank to negotiate loans with consortiums of banks; in other words, to seek credit on free capital markets.

Acording to estimates, Belgrade needs about DM3.4bn to stabilise its economic reforms. The money is to be used for refinancing, the repayment of old credits and for current projects as well as important imports.

Although Yugoslavia's overall indebtedness to the West amounts to about DM26bn, the country's credit rating is good because of its prompt repayments and its foreign exchange reserves.

Last year's reserves were more than DM3.4bn; and economic pundits say that foreign exchange reserves to pay for imports should cover three months for an economy to be considered normal.

The latest report of the UN Organisation for European Economic Development says Yugoslavia's indebtedness is not critical. This could persuade Western banks to go along with credit applications.

Only a few days ago it became known that the World Bank had granted Yugoslavia a credit of DM187m. The money is to be used to develop underdeveloped areas, especially coal production in Bosnia and some other regions.

With its finance policy decision Belgrade has created favourable preconditions for Western credits. These decisions include the more than 30 per cent devaluation of the dinar in June, which is bound to have a favourable effect on Yugoslavia's trade and balance of payments.

Belgrade substantiates its credit applications by pointing to the fact that the loans would help maintain the flow of trade in both directions.

Considering the German-Yugoslav trade volume of close to DM8bn, this is a pretty powerful argument.

Gustav Chalupa

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 9 September 1980)

Aid to Poland a medium term facility

Any Western economic aid for Poland will be medium term. And German credit approvals for Yugoslavia are unlikely before the German elections on 5 October and before the IMF conference in Washington at the end of this month.

This is roughly the conclusion in Bonn government circles following President Carter's letter to Chanc[...] Schmidt and the information th[...] goslavia wants to borrow DM3[...] 1981 and 1982.

Bonn does not consider itself in [...] vanguard of help for Poland, espe[...] since the latest DM1.2 bn credit [...] from a consortium of banks rather [...] the government.

President Carter's letter (which [...] have been sent to other European [...] of government as well) emphasised [...] fact that the West must help Poland [...] the present explosive situation and [...] on the allies to discuss the issue.

Bonn has already begun contemp[...] ing the matter. It considers Pol[...] need for assistance as being me[...] term, concentrating on 1981 and [...] haps 1982. The EEC is not consi[...] the right body to coordinate Wester[...] because of its lack of authority.

Bonn is still undecided whether [...] in what proportion potential aid fo[...] land should be financed privately or by the government. In any event, there [...] talk now of other than the banks' m[...] ey.

Bonn is now trying to establish [...] Poland needs and what the governm[...] financial and legal scope of action [...] especially with a view to what mi[...] might not be considered interferen[...] Polish affairs.

Bonn circles point out that the [...] lume of potential German assis[...] "would not be very large" because [...] its without strings attached may [...] guaranteed by the state and the go[...] ment itself cannot grant a credit [...]

(Kieler Nachrichten, 6 Septemb[...])

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Learning to li[...] with the defi[...]

Germans will have to learn [...] with trade deficits with [...] exchange spent on oil and tourism [...] foreign countries, thus putting us [...] red.

Even the richest of countries [...] eventually become impoverished [...] continuously exports its affluence [...] form of cash.

This does not apply to prod[...] German direct investments abroad [...] type of investment has risen [...] DM5.1bn in 1977 to DM8.5bn [...] we did not invest abroad we [...] admit to being paupers. After all [...] industrialised countries competing [...] international markets are expe[...] put their surplus capital into [...] investments.

In doing so, they open up [...] sources for the underemployed [...] tion and ensure that market sha[...] not go to competitors who can af[...] be cheaper.

Close to three-quarters of our [...] ments abroad go into branches of [...] ness that are sensitive to raw ma[...] and export fluctuations. The chem[...] industry tops the list of investors [...] lowed by banks, electrical engine[...] and iron and steel.

Small and medium companies, [...] depend on direct investments as [...] big ones, receive active support from [...] German Society for Economic Co[...] tion (DEG). Statistics show that [...] nothing to do with exploiting pos[...] low wage regions or with ex[...] German jobs. Approximately 37 p[...] of Germany's direct investments [...] went to the United States.

Paul K[...]

(Nordwest Zeitung, 8 Septemb[...])

THE ECONOMY

Forecasting now a boom business – but scepticism grows

Scepticism and uncertainty about future economic developments are rife. This has made forecasting *the* growth business. Day after day, we are fed prognoses and projections on a wide variety of subjects.

So it is not surprising that wrong forecasts have become the order of the day and that the time lag between forecast and amendment is getting shorter all the time.

Changes of trend are particularly susceptible to error. As a result, many people view these forecasters as something akin to fortune tellers, palmists or teacup readers. But this is not quite correct.

Intuition in economic forecasting has now given way to econometric models. Economic policy makers expect forecasts to show them where action is needed and to provide them with advice on the quantitative rather than the qualitative effects of political measures.

Despite the massive use of computers and ever more sophisticated forecasting techniques, there is still a great deal of disagreement on the manner in which various economic data act upon each other.

The vaunted "objective regularities" in economic developments frequently prove of relatively short duration because the attitudes of investors, consumers and policy makers keep changing. They are evolutionary, so to speak.

These attitudes, once quantified, must therefore not be confused with stable data in a physical sense. They are always governed by a variety of elements and *full* of uncertainties.

The creators of models frequently overestimate the possibility of putting complex economic realities in a system of equal reactions and definitions.

Herbert Giersch is perfectly right in pointing to the fact that "there is no such thing as a computer with a nose and farsightedness" and that "the authorities have also not yet been blessed with these qualities."

Everybody knows that forecasts need a constant system of political, social and other socio-economic data. But forecasters are reluctant to speak of this, arguing that the uninitiated would not understand it anyway.

There is no getting away from the suspicion that the forecasters themselves are frequently unable to give the reasons for their premises and that, as a result, they forgo explaining them.

Perhaps they are also afraid that permitting themselves to be pinned down on facts, assumptions and interactions that determine a forecast would detract from their achievement.

To prevent creating the impression that they are not quite above-board in their work, they should openly present the framework conditions and assumptions with which they operate, even if this should take up more pages than the forecast itself.

One example: the forecast of GNP growth rates ranks among the most important in shaping economic policy. Frequently, especially when making international comparisons, the assumed effects of minimal changes on growth and employment become the subject of lively discussion.

But the measuring and calculating problems of the aggregate sum that makes up growth are enormous. Yet even though experts are well aware of this, they never talk of the margin of error in their work.

Take the study by Oskar Morgenstern on the exactitude of economic observations — especially those concerning the American GNP statistics. Morgenstern concludes that errors of between five and 10 per cent are by no means unrealistic. Applying this to the GNP and assuming a five per cent margin of error, we find that the German growth rate for 1978 and 1979, based on these figures, could be anywhere between minus two per cent and 19.8 per cent.

But the statistical growth rate for 1979 is 8.3 per cent. The effects of such margins of error are self evident and should make us wary of naively believing in figures.

Since even short-term forecasts are subject to a considerable margin of error, the problem becomes particularly grave where long-term predictions for individual branches of business and structural changes of the economy as a whole are concerned.

Telling examples are the Pasdach forecast on steel consumption and the Prognos Institute's projection on sectoral industrial structures in the Federal Republic of Germany. Both estimates were wrong.

Our knowledge about structural contexts remains scant. Periodically recurring patterns of structural change are not discernible.

This lends particular weight to the necessary assumption of framework conditions. They include: world-wide effects of trade and industrial strategies, the demographic development at home, structural changes of private and state consumption (preferably listed by product groups) price structures, the development of productivity and the effects of technical progress. All this must be reliably estimated for the next ten to 15 years.

This makes it incomprehensible that the trade unions keep demanding a provident structural policy which must of necessity be based on such forecasts.

But there is the danger that business decisions — especially in the investment sector — could prove wrong if based on such prognoses.

Coordinated measures based on wrong forecasts must lead to collective wrong decisions in many sectors of the economy with attendant disastrous effects on the national economy as a whole.

Countries with a centrally controlled economic policy clearly demonstrate that such concepts can solve neither growth and employment problems nor can they prevent them. Their primarily ideological optimism is therefore totally unwarranted.

Moreover, structural planning means investment control. This presupposes investment registration. But such an institution must of necessity lead to conflicts between the entrepreneur's freedom of decision in matters of investment and the requirements of a state-controlled structural policy.

There is a great danger that such a conflict situation — to prevent the foundations of a structural policy from becoming brittle — would be resolved in favour of structural controls by the government.

The individual freedom guaranteed by the Constitution can only be safeguarded in a market economy. It is up to the entrepreneur to use the chances provides by the market and to promote further development by accepting risks against which he cannot insure.

Experience shows that no technocrat can replace the nose every good entrepreneur has.

A decentralised coordination process in a market economy shifts the risk of wrong assessments to a large number of decision makers. Wrong individual decisions therefore have only limited effects, while collective decisions of that nature affect entire branches of business.

It is wrong to believe that a state or a quasi-governmental institution has as good an overview of structural changes as has the sum total of the business community.

There can be no doubt that rational political action also calls for concepts of possible economic, social and political trends. Forecasts help provide blueprints — varying in accuracy — concerning future developments. They also provide insights into the underlying conditions.

Alternative forecasts on the same issue are a must if the whole range of future trends is to be presented, if the uncertainty of projections is to be made clear and if the apparent mathematical accuracy of the results is to be put into perspective.

This competition among forecasters promotes the scientific process of analysis and prevents the premature elimination of politically undesirable forecasts.

Seen in this light, the fact that the five economic research institutes in this country differ in their interim reports on structural facts — and, indeed, contradict each other — is a positive element.

Siegfried Mann

(Die Welt, 5 September 1980)

The author is the general manager of the National Federation of German Industry.

Comparison with 30s inflation inappropriate, savers told

The usually conservative Society for the Protection of German Savers has rebutted the conservative election campaign slogan about an alleged forthcoming "currency reform" due to excessive state indebtedness.

The society consists of banking, insurance and building society associations. In a recent statement, it stressed — notwithstanding its critical attitude concerning the extent of state indebtedness — that any comparison of our present monetary problems with those of the 1920s and 1940s is not valid.

The statement says: "While at that time the gigantic state debts were financed by printing money, thus totally destroying the value of the currency, today we must prevent the Bundesbank from countering our growing state indebtedness by repeated concessions regarding its monetary and stability policy."

Today's monetary problems are entirely different from those of previous eras, the society says.

At that time, the state's access to the money-printing machinery enabled it to finance its spending by printing more money rather than by resorting to taxes and the savings of the public.

The Reich's debts were thus not financed through the capital market but were taken over by the Central Bank, which led to an enormous increase of the money supply and, hence, to total erosion of the value of money.

The institutional and theoretical framework conditions, however, have changed drastically since then.



"Politicians and economists are agreed that our currency must be safeguarded from inflationary erosion by a policy of tight money."

Together with the public stability consciousness in Germany, the function and independence of the Bundesbank provide the best possible protection against the abuse of the money presses.

Our rapidly growing state indebtedness in the past five years has nevertheless promoted inflation, the society says.

The large-scale deficit spending, it says, has prevented pressure on wages and has forced the Bundesbank to pursue an expansive policy which runs counter to stability.

The excessive liquidity of banks has facilitated the public sector's quest for credit.

The tension which this has caused on the money markets would have been even greater had savings by the public not kept interest rates down.

Therefore the society rejects any criticism of such savings activity. Saving does not only mean forgoing consumption but also makes spending possible in other sectors such as private investment, public sector investment or the export of capital abroad.

The society questions the "employment-promoting effects of public sector deficits."

"Only those state expenditures which are not financed through taxes or savings but through additional money and increased speed of monetary circulation can stimulate employment and consumption."

Since the Bundesbank embarked on its tight money policy at the latest it has been impermissible to speak of an economy-boosting effect of public sector deficits.

"The mere redistribution of incomes between the state, business, savers and consumers cannot stimulate the economy and employment."

It is therefore high time, the society says, to abandon the miracle belief in the effectiveness of Keynesian employment policy and to stop depicting the most important task of economic policy — the unburdening of public sector budgets from transfer and consumption spending — as lacking in urgency or, indeed, importance.


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
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
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
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










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FUEL & POWER

Munich conference calls for imagination in husbanding world's energy reserves

Bonn Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and Bavarian Premier Franz Josef Strauss opened the 11th International Energy Conference in Munich this month. They both emphasised the enormous importance of energy issues in the years ahead and stressed that all sources of energy would need harnessing to cope with the problem.

The International Energy Conference in Munich could hardly have been expected to take decisions. A gathering first convened in 1924 by the engineering profession, it holds no brief to do so.

It was a mammoth conference that was originally to have been held in Hamburg, but Hamburg hoteliers could not supply sufficient accommodation.

It dealt, as usual, with the latest estimate of world reserves of coal, oil, natural gas and uranium and with related issues of how they might best be exploited and used.

In the final analysis it is also a matter of ecology. So it was only logical for ecologists to hold their first counter-conference and outline their views on the subject in Munich.

But they did little more than roundly condemn atomic energy, and that is not enough. Both sides are strongly in favour of saving energy; a thorough discussion of reasonable alternatives was also called for.

Energy has grown scarce, even though you might not think so at present. The current surplus of coal, oil and natural gas could easily mislead you on how serious the position is.

For the time being oil remains the major energy commodity, and a handful of countries are in a position to turn the tap a little and transform the surplus into a international shortage.

Saudi Arabia probably deserves much of the credit for ensuring that no recourse has lately been taken to this dangerous game. As the world's largest oil exporter by far, Saudi Arabia would not have been prepared to play ball.

Supplies are only one aspect, albeit an important one, of the problems energy poses. Many factors are inter-related. Take, for instance, West Germany.

As one of the world's leading exporters Germany has in recent years consistently been blessed with a substantial trade surplus. But not any more.

This year's oil bill will amount to more than DM60bn, with the result that the balance of payments will tilt heavily into the red.

Exporters, we are told, must try harder and sell even better and more competitive goods in world markets. Sound advice this may be, but whether it will suffice in the long run is another matter.

Other oil-hungry countries are equally anxious to export more and pay their oil bills too. World market are no longer as capable of expansion as they once were, and many countries are in balance-of-payments trouble because their foreign exchange has to be spent on oil imports.

Petrodollar recycling, in other words borrowing cash from the rich oil countries, is not a solution that can be continued forever and a day either.

There is no substitute for the message the Munich conference had no alternative but to hammer home. It is that cutting back energy consumption in general and oil consumption in particular is the safest means of preventing the full fury of a crisis that at present is conveniently papered over by favourable circumstances.

It is also less a matter of industrial consumers, who calculate carefully and are already responding to higher oil bills, than of domestic consumption, which remains relatively high.

The state may offer tax incentives to those who are willing to save energy, but the decision on how to set about it is left entirely to would-be savers.

Should they install a heat pump, and if so, should it be powered by gas, diesel oil or electricity? Or should they install solar panels in the roof?

Should they install gas-fired central heating? Or ought they to wait for piped-in heating or heat absorber devices (that are still at the development stage)?

The wrong decision could so easily waste substantial tax subsidies. So maybe consideration should be given to setting up a state-subsidised but independent and impartial energy counselling service.

A non-profit making agency of this kind could be made the recipient of the cash that is overflowing in certain sectors of the energy business.

Apartment blocks could be fitted out with the latest in energy technology, with the energy consultant shouldering responsibility for bad investments, if any (but bearing in mind that new ground is sure to be broken).

The agency could charge the old heat or power rates until such time as the houseowner or landlord decides to buy the new equipment because he is convinced it really is a money-saver.

With a little imagination much could be accomplished.

Regulations for every situation pointless

But there is absolutely no point in trying to issue rules and regulations for every eventuality, much though it might be to the liking of many an energy policymaker.

This would throw the door wide open to state controls, and experience in the past two oil crises has shown that even though petrol and diesel oil were scarce at times supplies ran smoothest where the state kept intervention to a minimum.

The last thing we want is government bureaucracy in charge of energy supplies along the lines of the EEC farm market as run from Brussels!


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

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■ THE ARTS

Berlin Festival stars Stravinsky – with companies from Moscow and New York

The central theme of the 30th West Berlin Festival Weeks was devoted to the works of the Russian emigré Igor Stravinsky.

This shows more clearly than anything else how the picture has changed in three decades along with the change in the political constellation.

In the 1950s, the Festival Weeks were a window to the East, a demonstration of what the West had to offer culturally in the wake of reconstruction and growing affluence.

The borders were open and the visitors from the other Germany flocked across, especially since the deutschemark-East mark exchange rate was one to one. Moreover, the Festival Weeks also offered popular events — even boxing bouts were held.

The current Festival Weeks magazine is a guide through the five-week programme. The first section contains, apart from photographs and documents, a series of essay on Stravinsky and his works.

The second part has a chronicle of the previous Festival Weeks, which the Festival director, Ulrich Eckhardt, calls subjective.


Changes in yardstick of assessment

The enumeration of outstanding Festival events is full of surprises because the assessment of what is and what is not important is probably entirely different from today's vantage point than it was then.

As early as the second Festival in 1952, there was already an Indian dancing guest performance. And no-one would probably have thought that such a marginal event would become a worldwide trend 25 years later and that non-European cultures would become the subject of special festivals in Berlin, such as Metamusic and Horizons.

The change in Berlin's Festival Weeks is certainly not only due to political circumstances.

There is hardly a place left today without a festival of some sort. As a result, the expectations and demands placed on a major and relatively old-established festival city are very much higher.



Even top-notch guest performances — no matter how welcome — no longer suffice because they usually represent only a stopover on an extensive festival tour.

The Berlin Festival Weeks have therefore had a general theme in the past few years that dominated at least a goodly part of the performances.

In the case of an oeuvre as strongly dominated by music as is that of Stravinsky certain other forms of art must of necessity be somewhat neglected. But in view of the advantages of a festival that concentrates on one theme this is not too hard to accept.

What is missing with regard to Stravinsky is a major exhibition (for instance, the Paris art scene at the time of Diaghilev, the Fauves and the Cubists with Picasso).

But in view of the high cost, only the National Gallery could have afforded to put on such a show. However, the Gallery is busy with its big anniversary show.

The change in Berlin's Festival Weeks also includes the old dispute over the self-depiction of Berlin. Here, the change has by no means been positive only.

Originally, the cultural institutions of the city were the main providers of Festival attractions. Their own stagings were the focal point of interest, and this applied to foreign visitors as well.

The first Festival Weeks directors were usually the directors of the Opera or the Philharmonic. They did the Festival as a sideline, so to speak, acting primarily as coordinators.

Today, the Berlin Festival Weeks are almost tantamount to guest performances — perhaps enriched through a few of Berlin's own productions which have been suggested by the Festival organisers and partly financed by them.

The four Festival Weeks have turned into a chain of festivals throughout the year, and Festivals Ltd. has turned into a major administrative apparatus with a staff that is probably larger than that of Berlin's arts senator. In fact, the Festival director has turned into a sort of surrogate arts senator himself.

As desirable as this internationalisation, upvaluation and expansion might be for the city's cultural life, as annoying is the fact that Berlin's cultural institutions — above all the theatres — continue to absent themselves from the Festival.

This is partly due to personalities, and a change in the directorship of the state's own theatres could improve the atmosphere (something the Festival director has been trying to bring about for some time).

But then, what theatre director who is trying to time important premières to coincide with the Festival Weeks likes to be deprived of the fruit of his labours because all public attention focuses on the spectacular guest performances?

Clever planning could satisfy both needs and achieve a balanced blend. In fact, this is likely to become one of the main tasks of Festival Director Ulrich Eckhardt in the years to come.

Other festivals also have their [illegible] they seize upon trends or, indeed, anticipate them. Berlin now has chance to impress by top-level performances during its Festival Weeks [illegible] prove itself as a cultural metropolis not only for the moment but permanently.

A guest performance like that of [illegible]cow's Chamber Music Theatre [illegible] common term "Chamber Opera" is particularly welcome to the members [illegible] the ensemble) cannot be praised [illegible] and its challenge cannot be [illegible]mated.

Having had a huge success with [illegible]takovich's "The Nose" four years [illegible] the Chamber Music Theatre now [illegible]sented Igor Stravinsky's "The [illegible] Progress" — of course in Russian.

The ensemble consists predominantly of young people, many of whom [illegible] only just completed their training [illegible] in modest premises and has a [illegible] small budget. In Moscow it is considered an outsider's stage, overshadowed by [illegible] major theatres.

As a result, it resembles some [illegible] "free theatre groups" rather than [illegible] operas. Essentially, the ensemble [illegible] to stage operas in a popular fashion [illegible] complete balance between music, [illegible] and gesture. What this amounts to [illegible] "an opera that is palpable for every[illegible]dy." The audience is included and [illegible] use is made of comedy effects. The [illegible] are of utmost simplicity. They are [illegible]ed pictures (and this must be taken [illegible]rally) which mark the scene and out[illegible] which the performers step.

Emotions are converted into dance

Stravinsky's opera about careless Tom who permits himself to be drawn to the verge of disaster by a lively rake, half Mephisto, half Caspar or Spalanzani — a disaster from which his fiancée's faithful love saves him — is most suited to the tye of staging done by the Moscow ensemble. The libretto was written by W.H. Auden and Chester Kallmann. It was inspired by Hogarth's copper etchings.

Boris Pokrovsky, who heads the theatre, staged the whole thing loosely and entertainingly without losing sight of the necessary detachment.

His singer-actors were at their peak while the conductor, Anatoli Levin, and his orchestra did not quite follow the director's concept. Despite Stravinsky's quick succession of references to various 18th and 19th century composers and forms of music, he tried to force the score sheet into a continuous arc.

As a result, some of the musical wit was lost as was the of the closing passages in which the satire acquires a quality of sadness lyrically ending in Tom's insanity and death. But then, Soviet musicians are unlikely to be particularly familiar with Stravinsky's irony-soaked plays with forms.

The neoclassical Stravinsky triumphed with the New York City Ballet which presented two shows with a total of nine short ballet scenes.

George Balanchine, who has headed the NYC Ballet for more than four decades, has not only left the imprint of his style but has also made ballet history.

Classical Balanchine ballet is marked by his renouncing all superfluous props, by concentration on the beauty of movement and a generous, almost architectural rather than anecdotic, [illegible] The word "abstract" which could [illegible]ly come to mind in view of the empty stage is not one appreciated by the [illegible]year-old Balanchine. After all, [illegible] under his hands, there are people rather than robots moving on the stage. The action is frequently expressive, emotions are converted into dance notwithstanding the fact that there is an inclination towards gymnastic coolness.

Balanchine does not put the human body into a straitjacket. In his choreography, the dancers move almost naturally, if such a word can be applied to ballet at all.

The five pieces of the first evening were all choreographed by Balanchine and clearly bear his handwriting.

Under a common general concept, [illegible] precise transformation of Stravinsky's rhythms (the subtlety of which Balanchine has always admired without reservation) leads to special dancing characteristics in each piece. For instance, [illegible] "Movements" for piano and orchestra the miniature gestures of the [illegible] converted into corresponding movements in which heads and hands are particularly active.

There are no superstars here, the [illegible] being the ensemble as a whole.

The conductor, Robert Irving, and [illegible] instrumental soloists came from New York. The Berlin Symphony Orchestra made an effort without being particularly brilliant. Only the "Symphony [illegible] Three Movements" seems to have [illegible] well studied.

But then, opera theatres also have [illegible] habit of letting their second [illegible] best people play ballet music.

Rudolf [illegible]

(Frankfurter Rundschau, [illegible] September [illegible])



Suzanne Farrell and Peter Martins of the New York City Ballet, which is featuring nearly all Balanchine's Stravinsky productions at the Berlin Festival. (Photo: Ullspress)

■ PAINTING

Franz Marc struck a new balance with his animal motifs

Franz Marc, the *Blauer Reiter*, or Blue Horseman, of the Expressionist movement, was popular with German art-lovers until well after the war.

Only when American pop art took over the walls of a post-war generation brought up on Marx and Coca-Cola, and calendars and postcards went for feeling rather than *Gefühl* did Marc's popularity nosedive.

He had long been the most-reproduced German painter of the modern era, but his gentle deer in a light-filled four-colour forest and his classic equestrian motifs against a harmonious background landscape proved easy meat for the Easy Rider on his gleaming Harley-Davidson.

Franz Marc's faded memory has been resurrected this year, the centenary of his birth, by a comprehensive commemorative exhibition at the Lenbachhaus, Munich.

An obvious subject for critical review would surely have been Marc and his public. He was an innovator who was by no means disposed to compromise, yet he achieved the remarkable feat of popularising his aesthetic revolution without further ado.

In common with his turn-of-the-century contemporaries Marc set aside established concepts of form, yet appears to have done so without discord, striking a new balance that was not hard work getting used to.

What price did he pay for this reconciliation with the public? Was his mass appeal achieved at the price of a trivial choice of motifs, mainly unproblematic paintings of animals that have always been rated noble and beautiful?

Marc has also been accused of using rainbow hues and stylised forms to the extent of being more decorative than artistic.

Yet instead of dealing with issues such as these, which are very much to the point if not immediately important, the Munich exhibition makes do with the Olympian heights of art history.

But a telling tale is told. In his central chapter in the comprehensive catalogue Johannes Langner embarks on an experiment in comparative iconography as exciting as a detective thriller.

What is more, it runs counter to expectations in that the suspect, far from being found guilty of a capital offence, is proved blameless despite having previously been rated as guilty as they come.

Hitherto Franz Marc, a precursor of the modern era, has unquestioningly been hailed as one of the first avant garde artists to courageously cast aside the hollow salon art of the *fin de siècle*.

"At a very early date I felt humans were ugly," he wrote to his wife. "Animals seemed to more more beautiful, purer." He certainly drew rigorous consequences from this contempt for the world.

The contemporary Munich school set man on a pedestal in a decadent atmosphere of overcharged sensuality. Marc banished man from his purified pictorial visions of paradise.

Instead of man, who ate fruit from the Tree of Knowledge and betrayed his soul to the spirit, the artist peopled his Arcady with blue horses and yellow cows, creatures he felt were at the centre of Creation and still at one with nature.

Anxious to grasp the quintessence of creaturedom purely and undefiled by human intervention, he called, as an advocate of a pantheistic nature cult, for animalisation of art.

This seems to have been little more than pious self-deception. Instead of having found a pictorial language of his own that enabled him to gain access to the absolute essence of animal nature, he unconsciously used conventional composition and clichés he despised and erroneously thought to have surmounted.

In other words, Franz Marc did not really paint animals at all. In reality he painted humans in an animal guise.

To prove his point Langner has scoured art history and come across startling parallels. Marc's *Deer in a Wood*, for instance, have a striking similarity with Raphael's Holy Family.

Indeed, there would seem to be every good reason why Marc should adopt religious pictorial imagery, composition and style for his own purposes.

A Munich traditionalist in disguise, he sought to "establish symbols for the altars of future intellectual religions."

His *Tower of Blue Horses*, whereabouts unknown, testifies to a close relationship, in more than mere formal terms, with David's *Oath of the Horatians*. It boasts the same arrangement of heroic profiles.

As for the rear view of a horse deep in contemplation of a distant landscape, the comparison that comes to mind is Caspar David Friedrich's *Wanderer Across a Sea of Fog*.

But the animalisation idea grows somewhat odd when what one must assume the love of animals can no longer be reconciled with the pathos of the original. Feuerbach's *Iphigenie*, for instance, is transformed into a floppy-eared dog.

Iphigenie as a Dog is the title of Langner's essay, expressing surprise at this switch from the sublime to the ridiculous.

"Marc transforms animals into his own likeness," he writes, "and that on a course that began with a disappointed rejection of man as a suitable subject for painting."

Intellectually Marc was not a child of his age. Another essay by Carla Schulz-Hoffmann makes it clear that he belongs to the early 19th century.

"A reversion to pre-industrial conditions, agrarian romanticism, ideals such as German, homeland and purity," she writes, "testify to a return to the romantic era in which such values were felt to have been valid."

Striving for a new and better world

Many of Franz Marc's comments, the views of a latter-day romantic, could have been taken from Caspar David Friedrich or Philipp Otto Runge.

He felt he was at the end of an era and strove for a new and better world. He seems to have had a definite affinity with the first prophets of a typically German, mystical and irrational artificial religion.

There are clear links with Runge's colour symbolism. Marc felt blue was the embodiment of the male principle, acrid but intellectual.

Other points he holds in common with Runge are his preference for the landscape as the premier genre and his view of the artist as a priest (Novalis too, an early 19th century romantic, had regarded the artist as a "transcendental doctor").

Marc was also strongly in favour of the First World War, perhaps understandably so, although it is difficult to visualise the enthusiasm nowadays.

He was killed in action aged 36 at the Battle of Verdun in 1916. The Great War, he felt, was a thunderstorm of steel from which the nations of the world would emerge purified by Germany.

It remains to be seen how an erstwhile modern will weather such a radical ageing process.

Since post-modernism is a popular art term nowadays it may be that historicisation of Franz Marc, the one-time cult figure of the modern era, is appropriate to the age.

Wolf Schön

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, 5 September 1980)





Franz Marc: 'Blaues Pferd' 1911 (left) and 'Der Turm der blauen Pferde' 1913. (Photos: IP/Archiv)



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DIE GROSSEN 500

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The "Big 500" listings are based mainly on company turnover. All manufacturing, commercial and service companies that publish independent balance sheets and qualify in turnover terms are included. So are a fair number of companies that were hard on their heels in 1979. Some are sure to be promoted to the ranks of the Big 500 in 1980. The picture of West Germany's leading companies would be incomplete without banks and insurance companies; they are separately listed.

■ MEDICINE

Cancer 'more prevalent in the cities'

People living in cities are more likely to get cancer than country people, according to a study in Sweden.

The study, by the Cancer Environment Research Institute and headed by Professor Einhorn, based its findings on Swedish cancer statistics from 1961 to 1973.

A total of 375,000 cases (close to 99 per cent of all malignant tumour patients in Sweden during that period) were put through the computer complete with data on occupation, place of work and residence.

Still, it is anything but easy to track down the causes of cancer. Though Germany has no central cancer register that would facilitate research work, German scientists have been able to come up with some general information on the distribution of such malignant tumours.

Professor Dietrich Schmähl of the Institute for Toxicology and Chemotherapy of the German Cancer Research Centre in Heidelberg has pointed to the difficulties in arriving at a reliable assessment of the causes of the disease.

For one thing, he said, there are more than 100 types of cancer, all of which differ in course and symptoms. As a result, separate evaluations must be made.

Moreover, scientists know nothing about the environmental influences that could possibly be held responsible for breast cancer in women or prostate cancer in men.

As a result, it is impossible to say whether these tumours are more frequent among city dwellers or among people living in rural areas.

Things are different with other malignant tumours, for instance lung cancer, which claims more than 20,000 lives a year in Germany. The incidence of this type of cancer has rises dramatically since the turn of the century.

Cancer of the bronchial tubes, frequently also called smoker's cancer, is one of the most prevalent causes of death.

Here, Professor Schmähl says, it has in fact been established that "city dwellers with the same smoking habits as their rural counterparts are at greater risk."

There is no reliable scientific explanation for this observation, except that city people consult their doctor more frequently than do those in the country.

Professor Schmähl is sceptical about this explanation. He holds that smoking is aggravated in industrialised areas and above all in cities by the inhaling of polluted air which increases the effects of smoking.

Cancer-promoting substances such as benpyrinium, which are byproducts of regular combustion processes such as in the heating of homes, power stations, incinerators and road traffic, probably play an important role in lung cancer.

He is therefore emphatic in warning against attributing that type of cancer to smoking alone.

There are other examples that show that environmental influences play a role in cancer.

Skin cancer, for instance, can be caused by excessive sunbathing. Cancer of the stomach, on the other hand, has diminished considerably in this country over the past couple of decades. The reason could be our relatively strict legislation on the purity of food.

Professor Schmähl warns against hasty generalisations.

There is as yet no scientific evidence that a certain percentage of cancer cases are due to chronic environmental effects.

The International Cancer Research Institute in Lyon, France, assumes that chemical substances at the place of work account for one to two per cent of all malignant tumours, which can thus be termed occupational cancer, while the remaining 98 per cent are attributable to other causes.

There is also the fact that certain perfectly natural substances could cause tumours. A classical example here is aflatoxin, the metabolism byproduct of a common mildew fungus. And, finally, even seemingly harmless substances can cause cancer in humans.

Looking at cancer generally, Professor Schmähl says that there are three factors that can trigger the disease: environmental effects (natural or chemical substances and physical phenomena); a hereditary or acquired predisposition; and age, which plays a particular role in cancer.

The genetic predisposition is no longer in doubt. Cancer is more common in some families than in others, due to genetic factors. But it is still unknown how this genetic predisposition is programmed and when it will break out.

It is also reasonable to assume that cancer susceptibility can be acquired. For instance: gall bladder cancer never develops in a healthy gall bladder but only in a chronically inflamed organ. Stones are the most frequent culprits.

The older a person gets, the greater the statistical likelihood of his developing cancer: 75 per cent of cancer occurs after the age of 55.

Does this mean that age is a major element in cancer? Is cancer essentially a disease of dying tissue.

This theory, propounded among others by Professor Heinz Oeser in his book *Krebs — Schicksal oder Verschulden?* (Cancer — Destiny or Self-inflicted?) published by Georg Thieme Verlag, Stuttgart, does not quite coincide with the ideas of Professor Schmähl.

As he sees it, "age" is simply the length of time certain types of need to manifest themselves rather the patient's biological age.

The average life expectancy in having risen from 45 to 70 years 1870, cancer has obviously become prevalent. As today's man grows the length of time he is exposed tain noxious substances in his ment — be they of a chemical unknown nature or be they vira also grows.

Cancer thus has more time to and manifest itself and therefore frequently diagnosed than before.

Since we cannot influence the predisposition and the age, we concentrate our efforts on noxious vironmental elements. It is here Professor Schmähl sees one of the important tasks for toxicologists.

The intensive testing of certain and suspicious chemicals as provided in recent environmental legislation be a major prophylactic measure tain occupations and groups of the lic.

But Professor Schmähl doubts ther the new legislation will eliminate risks. Still, "it is a step in the direction," he says.

Certain types of work in the industrialised world must come under scrutiny if we are to protect the from 'occupational cancer'.

But there can also be no doubt certain ways of life increase the risk.

Professor Schmähl: "What I have mind here is particularly the inhalation of tobacco smoke and sive sunbathing which can cause of the skin."

Konrad Müller-Christiansen

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, 29 August)

Smoking stops lung cleansing systems, conference told

Smoking temporarily paralyses the natural cleansing mechanism of the human breathing system.

This cleansing function is essentially based on tiny vibrating hairs covering mucous membranes.

The hairs, which should be constantly in motion, carry alien matter to the mouth where it is either swallowed or spat out.

However, delegates to the World Congress on Bronchology, in Düsseldorf, were told that every puff of a cigarette temporarily paralyses these vibrating hairs.

Dr John Nahkosteen, of the Ruhr Clinic, in Essen, said that the hairs come to a standstill for between 45 and 60 minutes, which means that noxious substances can enter the lungs unhampered.

To find out how long nicotine, certain medications and noxious substances paralyse the cleansing mechanism of the respiratory system several tests have been developed to enable researchers to come up with exact information. Three of these methods were presented at the Düsseldorf congress.

One of them operates with radioactive substances which are inhaled and whose return to the mouth with exhaled air can be tracked.

Another method involves Teflon platelets with a diameter of about one millimetre which cannot be penetrated by X-rays and which are blown into the windpipe through a flexible bronchoscope.

These platelets can then be observed through an X-ray apparatus and the time it takes for them to be trannsported to the mouth can be measured. This enables researchers to establish the speed at which alien matter is cleared from the respiratory tract in millimetres per minute.

In a healthy person, this is about to 20 a minute. In heavy smokers drops to about 10.

But immediately after inhalation of cigarette the speed is virtually nil.

Chronic sufferers from bronchitis achieve only three to five millimetres minute.

Said Dr Nahkosteen: "This enables to provide exact information on clearing speed".

The third method, developed by Essen team of researchers, is the called brush biopsy.

This involves the insertion of a brush into the windpipe, which is then rubbed against the mucuous membrane. By doing this, parts of the membrane stick to the brush from where they are removed and put into a special solution. The tissue sample thus obtained is put under a microscope and the frequency of vibrations measured.

According to Dr Nahkosteen, the most important application of the methods lies in the prophylaxis chronic bronchitis which, in the Federal Republic of Germany, is the second most important cause of premature retirement.

Margot Said-Lang

(Kieler Nachrichten, 28 August)

Widows, widowers, run risk of 'broken heart' death

Some four years after the loss of their spouses, widows and widowers are at risk of dying of a broken heart, says a team of Marburg psychologists.

The psychologists made a study of what they say is the clearly higher mortality rate of people recently widowed.

According to the psychology magazine *Warum*, death from a broken heart is actually attributable to the loss of a loved person rather than to the negative side effects of being alone.

The death rate among widows and widowers is clearly higher than the national average. It is also higher than the death rate among single people.

The first six months after the death of a spouse are particularly critical: 40 per cent of widowers, the report says, follow their wives during this period.

With widows, this critical period does not occur until the second year after bereavement. Younger people and men are generally more at risk.

The "broken heart" truism, the Marburg psychologists say, has been confirmed: cardiovascular problems are far more frequent causes of death among the bereaved than, say, influenza, bronchitis, pneumonia or cancer.

The psychologists explain this transformation of sorrow into physical symptoms resulting in death as follows: on the one hand, increased stress overtaxes the immunity system and weakens organs that have already been affected by disease.


On the other hand, the lonely bereaved engage in a harmful way of life by drinking and smoking and taking more drugs than before.

Those, however, who have weathered the critical period prove healthier than others of the same age.

dpa

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 5 September 1980)

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■ LEISURE

Amusement parks maintain appeal

Recreation and amusement parks are mushrooming in the Federal Republic of Germany. They range from the small fairytale zoo round the corner, via game and safari parks, all the way to sophisticated rollercoaster parks.

Sierksdorf, on the Baltic, houses northern Germany's largest amusement park, Hansaland, formerly known as Legoland.

The whole thing is a blend of costly and sophisticated funfair attractions, shows and gambling halls.

Among Hansaland's more spectacular features is an artificial whitewater stretch with cataracts and all that goes with shooting the rapids. Here, the canoes are made of plastic but the ride is as exhilarating as it might be in the wilds of Canada.

Other visitors can take a ride in a leisurely, old-fashioned fishing boat under sail or they can watch porpoises and seals perform their tricks.

A parrot called Lora Eston amazes visitors several times a day with its long speeches and pithy remarks.

There are also a small museum, two cinemas and a complete Western town.

More than 800,000 people visited Hansaland last year.

This type of amusement park is aimed at satisfying a need that seems to have become more pronounced in the past few years. More and more people make use of the range of attractions offered by a highly sophisticated recreation industry in their search to fill their plentiful leisure time.

But how meaningful is it to spend one's free time in one of these amusement parks? Are there no better solutions for time off work — solutions that would provide more satisfaction and even be cheaper?

Carl Wenzel, former manager of Legoland and now a consultant for recreation and amusement parks, holds that everybody must know what is best for him.

Herr Wenzel: "To start with, there are many kinds of leisure facilities. Some show and explain a piece of reality. This is the case with shipping museums or with a park that shows the workings of an old mine. Here, the visitors enter the shaft and see how a mine was worked in the old days.

"Other parks convey the picture of an intact world. These are best exemplified by America's Disney World. But by the same token they also stand for escape into a fantasy world. This, too, has its place in our society because it unburdens the people of their everyday worries. And anything that helps the people is meaningful."

The question is, do these facilities really help the people or do they perhaps only help their operators to make a fortune? The fact is that not every one of these parks keeps the promises made in promotion pamphlets. Frequently, the visitor leaves with a sense of diappointment, having believed the brochures and paid his entrance fee.



Youthful fantasy in Hansaland's Wild West town. (Photo: Marianne von der Lu...)

Wenzel sees it this way: "Where there is much light there is also much shadow. This applies to the leisure business as it does to any other type of operation. There are outstanding facilities and there are others that aren't worth the price charged.

"But the consumer is very quick to react. In the past five years, a great many operators of such facilities have gone broke, losing a total of DM200m because they were wrong in their assessment of the consumer's needs."

Competition in this line of business is tough. To keep above water the parks must come up with ever new attractions.

Hansaland has introduced a new type of roller-coaster which the builders say is the biggest in Europe, with the cars making nerve-jangling loops in the air.

In the idyllic Sauerland, a baron has come up with a very special idea. He has erected a complete Western town and named it Fort Fun. According to his promotion material, it is Germany's biggest Western town. Its 25 buildings are said to faithfully reflect life in the Wild West. There is a saloon, a drugstore, a sheriff's office, a Wells Fargo agency and even a house of ill repute.

And what would a Western town be without the US Cavalry and Indian villages complete with tepees and campfires? And, of course, a genuine American sheriff is as much a must as is the piano player in the saloon.

Baron von Wendt says he got the idea for Fort Fun while touring North America. What he wanted was to show those who never had a chance to see America what a Western town was really all about.

Of course, the true driving force behind the project was probably the fact that the baron owns large forests through which anybody could stroll without paying a penny.

Today the baron's castle has been turned into a luxury hotel and on the outskirts of Fort Fun there is a complete vacation village with Finnish log cabins. Moreover, individualists can rent covered wagons modelled on those of the American pioneers and explore the baron's extensive holdings on their own.

Much attention has been paid to detail. The old iron horse, for instance, which pulls several cars with visitors through the park, is an exact replica of the old Wild West model.

With it all, the question remains whether the whole thing is just a run-of-the-mill amusement park providing a bit more comfort for the visitor.

The baron says: No. But he concedes that every such facility has a bit of the amusement park about it. According to him, Fort Fun can lay claim to more than just a funfair. Another type of recreation facility is the Voss-Winkel Game Park, also in the Sauerland. By pure coincidence, this, too, is run by a baron — in this case Baron von Boeselager. And he, too, is trying to turn his extensive forests into cash. Baron von Boeselager: "We're trying to make nature accessible without changing it too much. This is meant for the man-in-the-street rather than the hunter... it is meant to enable the citizen to get to the depths of the forest; and, as the name implies, what matters is not only the game in the woods but the fact that game and forest should be an integrated whole. "We would like the visitor to experience and become familiar with all the sounds, smells and the taste of a forest."

Hansaland, Fort Fun and the Voss-Winkel Game Park are only three of dozens of such facilities — and their number is certain to rise in the near future as the need for recreation and leisure facilities increases.

Wenzel is convinced that what is happening now in this field is only the tip of an iceberg.

So far as the technical-amusement parks are concerned, this will mean more investment, greater attractions and yet more thrills.

But parks of this kind will not dominate the market alone. At present, there is a boom in open-air museums, more and more of which try to convey an idea of cultural and historic heritage — not schoolmasterly but in an interesting and almost playful way.

Michael Petzel

(Kieler Nachrichten, 5 September 1980)




Wild West railway at Fort Fun. (Photo: Freizeit-Zentrum Sauerland)





Only for the stout-hearted. (Photo: Hansaland Sierksdorf)



SPORT

Injury to overseas player another example of soccer's ugly side

Frankfurter Rundschau

Bum Kun Cha is a 27-year-old Korean soccer player who was seriously injured early this season in a game for Eintracht Frankfurt against Bayer Leverkusen.

Not long ago no one had ever heard of him and experts still disagree on how his name should be transcribed.

But he was badly fouled and soccer fans all over Germany are keeping their fingers crossed he will recover and are indignant at the foul play that had him stretchered off the pitch.

Germans are not normally much concerned about foreign nationals, especially German soccer fans, but this case has caught the public's fancy because it is so indicative of the state soccer has reached.

Injuries as serious as this do not occur every week, and not every player who lies in apparent agony in the grass is as badly hurt as the unfortunate Korean forward in Frankfurt's colours.

But there are dozens of instances every Saturday of fouls that are no less unscrupulous. The only difference is that bids to intimidate apposing players usually have less serious consequences.

Intimidation on the soccer pitch is the alarming consequence of a trend towards spiralling contempt for life and limb and unbounded cynicism in the quest for victory at all costs.

The blow that floored Cha was no coincidence. Every week soccer fans witness acts of violence that entail the gravest risks. For the most part they cannot be classified as retaliation either.

As a rule soccer pros are quick to learn how to keep their tempers at bay. If they are unable to do so they run a serious risk of being sidelined sooner or later for incompetence.

What makes the outlook so gloomy and soccer so dangerous for a player of Cha's artistry is deliberate violence on the field of play a madness with method in it.

It is usually practised by mediocre players with few scruples about carrying out their tactical missions. As long as they are around the artists of soccer stand little chance of emerging from an encounter unscathed.

Players who cannot be eliminated by fair means must be nobbled by foul ones. This is the unwritten law of the soccer business.

What is more, there is absolutely no hope of a solution, since there is no alternative to the players briefed to put others out of action.

They are merely the last link in a long chain of pressure from outside and inside in relentless reciprocity.

No-one wants to put the clock back. Soccer, the most popular spectator sport, has been a professional game for over a century, but never more so than now.

It would have been a miracle if commercial considerations were not to have made serious inroads into — let us say — moral ones. There is simply too much at stake.

The result is a pressure to win at all costs that is so powerful the flower of fair play is bound to fade and die.

The dictates of turnover prompt responses leading from the fans to the board and from the manager and trainer to the players on the pitch: responses in which soccer hoodlums give as good as they get.

Players are in constant anxiety to retain their place in the team and maintain a standard of living befitting someone who earns a small fortune.

So in every fixture they are to all intents and purposes playing against two men: the opposing player they have been briefed to mark and eliminate if need be and the substitute on the trainer's bench who is only waiting to take their place.

No-one is more upset than the offender himself when a foul results in serious injury. There can be no doubt that this is not what they intended; they would have preferred it to be a less costly exercise.


But in the hue and cry of professional soccer they have only a limited influence on the price that may have to be paid. So a fairly commonplace sporting episode may easily result in two tragic figures.

The one is the player who is stretchered off the field and rushed to hospital. The other is the man who fouled him and has to be given police protection from the wrath of incensed fans.

Ludwig Dotzert

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 1 September 1980)

Cyclist paced on the way to world championship



Wilfried Peffgen (left) hard on the pedals of the pace maker, Dieter Durst. (Photo: Werek)

Wilfried Peffgen, 37, from Cologne won his world championship title in Besancon, France, to end the professional cycling track racing season with a success for Germany.

Aided by 40-year-old pacemaker Dieter Durst from Katzwang, Peffgen successfully withstood challenges by Rene Kos of Holland and Bruno Vicina of Italy for 50 minutes to win his crown.

"It was the toughest race I have ever run," he said afterwards, overjoyed.

The amateurs were a distinct disappointment. Minneboo and Pronk of Holland made short shrift of the competition and left Breuer, the former world champion from Fürth, and Podlesch from Berlin with no hope.

So Peffgen's title win as a professional was some consolation. Heinz Betz, the Böblingen pro, Josef Kristen, an unknown Cologne amateur, and Claudia Lommatzsch, 16, won bronze in their respective events.

In the tandem 20-year-old Münster specialist Giebken, partnered by 18-year-old white hope Fredy Schmidtke from Cologne, were eliminated in the semi-finals.

dpa

(Hamburger Abendblatt, 8 September 1980)

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German roller skaters take bulk of European medals

West German roller skaters continue to reign supreme in Europe, having won 15 of the 24 medals awarded at the European championships in Trieste.

Italy, despite the advantage enjoyed by the home team, managed only to corner the other nine.

World champion Michael Butzke, 20, from Bremerhaven fared best, winning all three medals: the set piece, the freestyle and the combination.

Thomas Wieser, 16, from Munich had a long wait before he could be sure of second place in the combination. It was the first time the three categories were adjudged in this way at the European championships and it seemed ages before the results were announced.

The organisers certainly appeared to be using strange modes of calculation. There was even talk of manipulation. But rigging or not, delays there were.

World champion Petra Schneider from Heilbronn came fourth at the German championships and so failed to qualify for Trieste. Her place was taken by Petra Ernert, 17, from Mannheim.

She gave what undoubtedly the best and most attractive freestyle display at the Palazzo dello Sport. Having come third in the set piece and first in the freestyle, she won the combination title too. The best set piece at Trieste was skated by pretty Stuttgart girl Claudia Bruppacher.

In the pairs dancing, German couples came first and second to oust the Italians. Inka Pohland and Torsten Scholz from Kiel outskated the highly fancied world championship runners-up Gabriele Achenbach and Torsten Carels, also from Kiel.



Michael Butzke . . . three medals. (Photo: Sven Simon)

Rudolf Schade, the German team manager, was annoyed. "The organisation was faulty, there were no competition lists, it took ages to work out the results and a number of judges had no international experience whatever," he complained.

But the medals his team won are sure to have consoled him to no small extent.

sid

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 1 September 1980)